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“ASK YOUR DOCTOR IF THIS PRODUCT IS RIGHT FOR YOU”: 
PEREZ v. WYETH LABORATORIES, INC., DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER 
ADVERTISING AND THE FUTURE OF THE LEARNED 
INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE IN THE FACE OF THE FLOOD OF 
VIOXX® CLAIMS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A television commercial fades into a scene depicting a woman peacefully 
asleep with a warm smile on her face.  The camera pulls back focusing on a 
cartoon fairy flying around the room while a deep soothing voice recounts the 
product’s possible risks “product may cause blood clots, heart attack, and in 
the extremely rare cases, stroke.  To find out if this product is right for you, 
consult your doctor.”  The viewer thinks, “Why can’t I sleep like that? I want 
that magical pill.”  However, what consumers need to understand is that there 
are no magical pills.  Every prescription drug is inherently coupled with risks 
and dangers of which consumers need to consider before swallowing pills by 
the handful. 
Further problematic is the degree to which the average consumer heeds the 
brief warning at the close of the commercial once they believe the advertised 
product is their cure-all.  Some argue that manufacturers who engage in direct 
to consumer advertising, the dissemination of product information from drug 
manufacturers directly to the end consumer, should face direct product liability 
because of those advertising efforts.  Others, however, argue the learned 
intermediary doctrine, which relieves drug manufacturers of their duty to 
directly warn the end consumer of product dangers by instead providing 
warnings to prescribing physicians, should continue to shield manufacturers 
from liability.1 
Pharmaceutical companies employing mass direct-to-consumer advertising 
campaigns should remain protected by the learned intermediary doctrine as 
advertising techniques have not fundamentally changed the physician’s role in 
prescribing medications to warrant the doctrine’s elimination.  A line must be 
drawn with respect to the degree of warning provided to the American public; 
manufacturers should not be required to overload consumers with product 
 
 1. See discussion infra at part III.  Also, for a detailed discussion concerning the 
development of the law of liability for pharmaceutical manufacturers and FDA regulation of 
prescription drug approval and the learned intermediary doctrine, see Victor E. Schwartz and Phil 
Goldberg, A Prescription For Drug Liability and Regulation, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 135 (2005). 
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warnings in order to ensure they understand potential hazards.  Undeniably, 
each consumer should retain the ability to read and understand product 
warnings and appreciate the potential side effects of the product, and 
corporations should by no means be permitted to misrepresent, leave out, or 
misconstrue their products’ dangers.  One commentator noted that “No one 
disputes that the ultimate user of any product has the right to be apprised of 
risks associated with that use.”2 
This comment will discuss whether the learned intermediary doctrine 
should continue to be applied considering the increase in direct-to-consumer 
marketing.  Specifically, it will address whether an exception to the learned 
intermediary doctrine should be accepted for product liability claims against 
pharmaceutical manufacturers for failure of the duty to warn given direct-to-
consumer marketing, the court’s decision in Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, 
Inc.,3 and the learned intermediary doctrine, focusing on the influx of litigation 
concerning the drug Vioxx. 
This comment concludes that no exception to the doctrine should be 
provided due to the increased use of ect-to-consumer advertising because 
“[l]iability for inadequate warnings will almost certainly increase if courts 
abandon the learned intermediary rule and require drug manufacturers to warn 
consumers instead of physicians when they engage in direct to consumer 
advertising.”4 
To reach this conclusion, this comment will address the current state of the 
law regarding manufacturers’ duty to warn, the advent of direct-to-consumer 
advertising, the scope of the learned intermediary doctrine, the doctrine’s fate 
following Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., FDA regulation of 
pharmaceutical advertisements, and current mass tort litigation surrounding 
Vioxx. 
II.  CURRENT LAW REGARDING THE DUTY TO WARN 
A. General Overview of the Duty to Warn 
Product manufacturers and sellers are generally under a common law duty 
to provide adequate warning to consumers of possible dangers associated with 
a product’s use.5  The duty to warn extends to a product’s manufacturer, seller, 
 
 2. See discussion infra at part IV. 
 3. See generally Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999). 
 4. Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater Tort 
Liability for Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 97 (2002). 
 5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1961).  It states 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user 
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to 
the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if: (a) the seller is engaged in the 
business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] “ASK YOUR DOCTOR IF THIS PRODUCT IS RIGHT FOR YOU” 423 
distributor, dealer, wholesaler or supplier.6  Thus, non-manufacturers may be 
subject to liability for a product where predecessors in the distributive chain 
failed to provide the consumer with an adequate warning.7  Under the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, the duty requires manufacturers to warn of a 
product’s danger if the manufacturer or supplier knows (1) the product is 
dangerous, (2) that the danger is not obvious or known to or readily 
discoverable by the user, and (3) not one which arises only because the product 
is put to some unforeseeable or unexpected use.8 
The duty to warn serves two specific functions.  First, the duty aids in 
instructing consumers to proper product use in hopes of reducing injuries 
resulting from misuse.  Secondly, by having access to the warnings, the 
consumer is able to make an informed choice whether to use the product and 
be exposed to the associated risks.9 
However, a manufacturer’s failure to provide an adequate warning renders 
the product unreasonably dangerous and thus subjects the manufacturer to 
liability for damages under strict liability.10  Though including an adequate 
 
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule 
stated in Subsection (1) applies although: (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in 
the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the 
product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. 
Id. 
 6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. f (1965).  It states 
The rule stated in this Section applies to any person engaged in the business of selling 
products for use or consumption.  It therefore applies to any manufacturer of such a 
product, to any wholesale or retail dealer or distributor, and to the operator of a restaurant.  
It is not necessary that the seller be engaged solely in the business of selling such 
products.  Thus the rule applies to the owner of a motion picture theatre who sells popcorn 
or ice cream, either for consumption on the premises or in packages to be taken home. 
Id. 
 7. J. Scott Dutcher, Comment, CAUTION: This Superman Suit Will Not Enable You to 
Fly—Are Consumer Product Warning Labels Out of Control?, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 633, 635 (2006). 
 8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965).  It states 
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is subject 
to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the consent of 
the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the use of 
the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the 
supplier: (a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous 
for the use for which it is supplied, and (b) has no reason to believe that those for whose 
use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and(c) fails to exercise 
reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it 
likely to be dangerous. 
Id. 
 9. JAMES A. HENDERSON & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND PROCESS 337 
(4th ed. 2000); Caroline L. Nadal, The Societal Value of Prescription Drug Advertisements in the 
New Millennium: Targeted Consumers Become the Learned, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 451, 457-58 (2001). 
 10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
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warning provides protection from strict liability, warnings will not necessarily 
protect manufacturers from claims for product defects.11  In constructing these 
adequate warnings, manufacturers are not required to foresee all possible uses 
or misuses of their products, but are only required to provide warnings to each 
consumer according to reasonably foreseeable uses and misuses.12 
B. Foundational Elements of a Failure to Warn Cause of Action 
Plaintiffs injured from allegedly defective products may bring failure to 
warn claims against the product’s manufacturer, seller or distributor.13  To 
succeed, plaintiffs must establish (1) that the manufacturer, supplier, or seller 
knew or should have known of the dangers related to the product’s intended 
use; (2) the product’s user was reasonably unaware of these dangers; (3) the 
manufacturer, supplier or seller failed to exercise reasonable care to notify the 
consumer of the product’s unsafe condition or of facts which make the product 
prone to be dangerous, and (4) that the risk and degree of harm was large 
enough to justify that a warning should have been provided.14 
Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts, three primary methods exist for 
plaintiffs to establish that a product is defective.15  First, a consumer can 
establish a manufacturing defect in the product by proving that the product 
deviates from the manufacturer’s design or performance standards of identical 
units.16  Secondly, a product may be defective by design where the injured 
 
 11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998); see also 
Dutcher, supra note 8, at 635. 
 12. Dix W. Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 SW. 
L.J. 256, 264 (1969) (citing Glittenberg v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., 491 N.W.2d 208, 212 
(Mich. 1992)). 
 13. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1961). 
 14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998). 
 15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a)-(c) (1998) It states 
A product is defective when, at the time of sale or distribution, it contains a 
manufacturing defect, is defective in design, or is defective because of inadequate 
instructions or warnings. A product: (a) contains a manufacturing defect when the product 
departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the 
preparation and marketing of the product; (b) is defective in design when the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of 
a reasonable alternative design by the seller or other distributor, or a predecessor in the 
commercial chain of distribution, and the omission of the alternative design renders the 
product not reasonably safe; (c) is defective because of inadequate instructions or 
warnings when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product could have been 
reduced or avoided by the provision of reasonable instructions or warnings by the seller or 
other distributor, or a predecessor in the commercial chain of distribution, and the 
omission of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably safe. 
Id.; see also Kenneth Ross, Legal and Practical Considerations for the Creation of Warning 
Labels and Instruction Books, 379 P.L.I. LITIG. 103, 105 (1989). 
 16. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998). 
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party can establish that a design defect exposed the user to a reasonably 
preventable risk.17  Finally, the product may be deemed unreasonably 
dangerous due to market defects.18  Market defects include (1) the failure to 
provide warning of the risks or hazards of using the product, (2) failure to 
provide an adequate warning of those risks or hazards,19 or (3) failure to 
provide appropriate and adequate instructions and directions for safe use of the 
product.20 
C. Liability and Prescription Drug Manufacturers 
Restatement (Second) of Torts places pharmaceutical drugs into a category 
of products designated as “unavoidably unsafe.”21  The “unavoidably unsafe” 
product category of comment k is governed by a separate standard which 
stands as “an exception to the Restatement’s general rule that one who markets 
goods must warn foreseeable ultimate users of dangers inherent in the 
product.”22  Distribution of unavoidably unsafe products is rationalized on the 
ground that “[a]ll prescription drugs pose hazards, whether minute or great, to 
consumers.  However, the same drugs cure life-threatening diseases, remedy 
crippling illnesses, alleviate physical aches, pains, and provide numerous other 
benefits.”23  More specifically, section 6 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts 
 
 17. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998). 
 18. See id. 
 19. For the purposes of this note, what constitutes an inadequate warning for general 
consumer goods is immaterial and will not be discussed.  See  infra text accompanying notes 106-
07 for a discussion of adequate warnings for pharmaceuticals. 
 20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) (1998) (emphasis 
added). 
 21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) cmt k (1965). It states 
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state of 
human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary 
use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. . . . Such a product, properly 
prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it 
unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, 
many of which for this very reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under 
the prescription of a physician. . .The seller of such products, again with the qualification 
that they are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the 
situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences 
attending their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an 
apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable 
risk. 
Id. 
 22. Woodside, III & Maggio, supra note 3, at 2; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 402(A) cmt. k (1969). 
 23. Nadal, supra note 10, at 459. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
426 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:421 
addresses product liability for prescription drug manufacturers24 and applies 
only to those products sold or distributed through a health care provider 
prescription.25 
Restatement (Third) of Torts §6(d), addressing liability for defective or 
inadequate warnings for pharmaceuticals, provides: 
(d) A prescription drug or medical device is not reasonably safe because of 
inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable instructions or warnings 
regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not provided to: 
(1) Prescribing and other health care providers who are in a position to reduce 
the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings; or 
(2) The patient when the manufacturer knew or had reason to know that no 
health care provider would be in a position to reduce the risks of harm in 
accordance with instructions or warnings.26 
An adequate warning is one that presents information about all significant 
risks accompanying a product’s use and discloses “the actual likelihood and 
gravity of such risks when they are known by the manufacturer.”27  A warning 
may be deemed inadequate if the print is too small,  not in a prominent 
position, phrased with insufficient intensity to be proportional to the danger, is 
ambiguous or not easily understood, not geared toward its intended audience 
(i.e. technical language to warn lay persons), or not communicated through 
appropriate channel.28 
Both the Restatement (Second) of Torts and Restatement (Third) of Torts 
suggest that drug manufacturers should not be held strictly liable for failure of 
 
 24. Michael J. Wagner & Laura L. Peterson, The New Restatement (Third) of Torts—Shelter 
From the Product Liability Storm for Pharmaceutical Companies and Medical Device 
Manufacturers, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 225, 229 (1998). 
 25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(a) (1998), stating, 
A manufacturer of a prescription drug or medical device who sells or otherwise distributes 
a defective drug or medical device is subject to liability for harm to persons caused by the 
defect. A prescription drug or medical device is one that may be legally sold or otherwise 
distributed only pursuant to a health-care provider’s prescription. 
Id. 
 26. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998). 
 27. Ausness, supra note 5, at 104-05 (citing Martinkovic v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 
212, 216 (N.D. Ill. 1987)). 
 28. See id. at 105-06 (citing Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238, 243 (4th Cir. 1971); 
D’Arienzo v. Clairol, Inc., 310 A.2d 106, 111 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1973); Salmon v. Parke, 
Davis & Co., 520 F.2d 1359, 1363 (4th Cir. 1975); Mahr v. G.D. Searle & Co., 390 N.E.2d 1214, 
1230 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Bryant v. Technical Research Co., 654 F.2d 1337, 1345-46 (9th Cir. 
1981); MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E. 2d 65, 71-72 (Mass. 1985); Sterling Drug, 
Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 991-92 (4th Cir. 1975)). 
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the duty to warn of unknown potential dangers.29  Recognizing the potential 
negative impacts product liability could have on a manufacturer’s future 
research and development, courts adopted a negligence standard for imposing 
liability on drug manufacturers when they act unreasonably by failing to warn 
of dangers of which they knew or should have known.30  “The test turns on 
whether the defendant acted as a reasonably prudent manufacturer would have 
acted in similar circumstances. . . .the test plainly provides that no liability 
results for unknown and unknowable risks.”31 
The Restatement (Third) of Torts, therefore, has adopted what is known as 
the learned intermediary doctrine, which relieves drug manufacturers of their 
duty to warn end consumers when adequate warnings were instead provided to 
prescribing physicians.32  The physicians then have the duty to warn individual 
patients of the drug’ dangers before issuing a prescription.33 
III.  DIRECT-TO-CONSUMER ADVERTISING 
In 2003 alone, American pharmaceutical companies spent $3.2 billion 
marketing prescription drugs directly to consumers.34  Direct-to-Consumer 
(DTC) advertising is the dissemination of product information by 
pharmaceutical manufacturers directly to end consumers, subject to the control 
of the Food & Drug Administration (FDA).35  DTC advertising employs an 
array of mediums, including magazines, newspapers, television, radio, and 
other outdoor advertising.36  Marjorie Powell, General Counsel for the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, stated that “DTC 
 
 29. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 459; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) 
cmt. k (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. m (1998). 
 30. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 451. 
 31. Wagner & Peterson, supra note 25, at 234-235. 
 32. The learned intermediary doctrine (LID), the focus of this note, is the subject of greater 
discussion starting in Part IV.  Also adopted by the Restatement (Third) of Torts, however, are 
several generally accepted exceptions to the LID, and one hotly contested proposed exception.  
The debated exception, holding manufacturers liable for failure of their duty to warn when 
engaging in Direct-to-Consumer (DTC) advertising, is also the subject of discussion beginning in 
Part IV.C. 
 33. See infra Part IV: The Learned Intermediary Doctrine. 
 34. See KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Prescription Drug Trends, Oct. 2004, available at 
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/Prescription-Drug-Trends-October-2004-UPDATE.pdf (last 
visited May 16, 2007). 
 35. See Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs: What are the 
Consequences?: Hearing Before the Special Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 61 (2003) (statement 
of Marjorie E. Powell, Senior Assistant General Counsel, Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America) [hereinafter Powell]. 
 36. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, Impact of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising on 
Prescription Drug Spending, Jun. 2003, at 4, available at http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/ 
loader.cfm?url=/commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PageID=14378 (last visited May 16, 2007) 
[hereinafter Impact]. 
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advertising’s purpose is to inform and educate consumers about treatable 
conditions, the symptoms that may help them identify the diseases, and 
available therapies.”37 
Though hard to imagine, pharmaceuticals, unlike most products, were not 
always advertised directly to potential consumers.38  Instead, drugs were only 
marketed directly to physicians who would then choose which drugs they 
would prescribe.39 Undoubtedly, pharmaceutical advertising changed 
drastically with the advent of DTC advertising.  “The modern era of DTC 
advertising really began in 1985 when [the] FDA announced that the 
regulations for overseeing promotion to doctors provided sufficient safeguards 
to protect consumers, as well.  After this, increasing numbers of DTC print 
advertisements appeared.”40 
DTC advertising further evolved in the 1980s with the infamous product 
Rogaine®, manufactured by the Upjohn Company, the first prescription drug 
to be advertised on television.41  Following Upjohn’s marketing breakthrough, 
“almost all pharmaceutical companies have engaged in this direct marketing 
practice.”42  In 1997, further changes in FDA regulations, which removed the 
requirement that broadcast advertisements must state all product information, 
also had a significant impact on the use of DTC advertising.43  The new 
regulations regarding broadcast advertisements provided manufacturers the 
ability to promote specific products on television and radio with less 
information regarding side effects than what was required of print ads.44  By 
eliminating the full disclosure requirement, the FDA provided the industry 
 
 37. Powell, supra note 36, at 61. 
 38. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1246-47 (N.J. 1999) (“Our medical-legal 
jurisprudence is based on images of health care that no longer exist.  At an earlier time, medical 
advice was received in the doctor’s office from a physician who most likely made house calls if 
needed.  The patient usually paid a small sum of money to the doctor.  Neighborhood pharmacists 
compounded prescribed medicines.  Without being pejorative, it is safe to say that the prevailing 
attitude of law and medicine was that the ‘doctor knows best.’” (citing Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. 
Ass’n 465 A.2d 294, 299 (Conn. 1983))). 
 39. See Ausness, supra note 5, at 98 (“At one time, prescription drug manufacturers directed 
their promotional efforts solely at physicians and other health care providers.  They provided 
information about their products in the Physician’s Desk Reference and sometimes placed 
discreet advertisements in medical journals and other professional publications.”). 
 40. See Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs: What are the 
Consequences?: Hearing Before the Special Comm. on Aging, 108th Cong. 29 (2003) (statement 
of Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration) [hereinafter Woodcock]. 
 41. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1251. 
 42. Id. The court also stated “These campaigns ‘bring to bear all the slick pressure of which 
Madison Avenue is capable.’”  Id. (citation omitted). 
 43. See infra Part VI.A-B. 
 44. See Impact, supra note 37, at 1. 
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with a more cost-effective method of advertising warning compliance.45  After 
the 1997 changes, “the FDA provided the impetus for drug manufacturers to 
launch full-scale advertising programs (in broadcast media) directed at 
consumers,” and manufacturers dramatically increased the use of television ads 
to tout their latest products.46  The number of DTC broadcast advertisements 
submitted to the FDA following the changes has been 293 in 1999, 443 in 
2000, 376 in 2001, 486 in 2002, 474 in 2003, and 586 in 2004.47 
Although pharmaceutical promotion spending has increased, doubling 
from $9.2 billion in 1996 to $19.1 billion in 2000, most promotional spending 
(approximately 86%) remains directed towards physicians.48  Thus, only 14% 
of pharmaceutical advertising dollars are spent on DTC advertisements.  
Though only a small portion is spent on DTC advertising, it “seems to be the 
fastest growing part of the marketing budget.”49  Expenditures on DTC 
advertising rose from $800 million in 1996 to $2.7 billion in 2001, and reached 
$3.2 billion in 2003.50  Further, 84% of those surveyed in a 2002 Kaiser 
Family Foundation study reported they had seen or heard an ad for prescription 
medication.51 
To pharmaceutical companies, these advertising campaigns serve a vital 
function.  DTC advertising focuses the consumer’s attention on the product 
and encourages those patients to consult their physicians regarding the 
 
 45. Jaclyn Carole Hill, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Beyond: Exploring Direct-
to-Consumer Drug Advertising Liability In the New Millennium, 72 DEF. COUNS. J. 362, 362 
(2005). 
 46. Id. at 364-65 (parentheses added); Christopher Q. Pham, The Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine and DTC Advertising, L.A. LAW. Feb. 26, 2004, at 16; see also MARCIA ANGELL, THE 
TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG  COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 
123-24 (2004); see also Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1251 (N.J. 1999) (“Pressure 
on consumers is an integral part of drug manufacturer’s marketing strategy.  From 1995 to 1996, 
drug companies increased advertising directed to consumers by ninety percent.”). 
 47. The Impact of Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising on Seniors’ Health and Health 
Care Costs: Hearing Before the Special Comm. on Aging, 109th Cong. 20 (2005) (statement of 
Rachel E. Behrman, M.D., M.P.H., Deputy Director, Office of Medical Policy Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research, U.S. Food and Drug Administration) [hereinafter Behrman]. 
 48. See Impact, supra note 37, at 3 (further breaks down the spending and shows 29% of the 
spending is through sales representative directed at physicians and hospitals, 55% of the spending 
is accounted for by free drug samples that pharmaceutical representatives provide to physicians, 
14% on DTC advertising, and 2% on advertising in medical journals). 
 49. ANGELL, supra note 47, at 123. 
 50. Press Release, Kaiser Family Foundation, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug 
Advertising Adds Significantly to Prescription Drug Spending Growth, New Study Finds (Jun. 11, 
2003), available at http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/ upload/impact-of-driect-to-consumer-advertising-
on-prescription-drug-spending-new-release.pdf); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO 
CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTORS 03-177, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: FDA OVERSIGHT OF DIRECT-TO-
CONSUMER-ADVERTISING HAS LIMITATIONS 3 (2002). 
 51. See Impact, supra note 37, at 4. 
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advertised drug.52  “For consumers/patients, such marketing suggests a 
movement in an evolving health care system where patients are making 
decisions that doctors used to make for them.”53  In 2001, AstraZeneca spent 
$500 million persuading consumers to switch from Prilosec to Nexium.54  Of 
specific importance to this comment, as will later be discussed, Merck & Co., 
Inc. spent $160 million in 2000 advertising its osteoarthritis drug Vioxx.55 
Overwhelming evidence establishes the effectiveness of such campaigns as 
“[t]hese efforts are not just an essential part of manufacturer’s marketing plans; 
they are an extremely successful one.”56  Prior to 1980, drug sales remained 
relatively level.57  However, from 1980 to 2002 drug sales in the United States 
tripled, reaching more than $200 billion a year.58  Further, a 2001 Kaiser 
Family Foundation study showed 30% of consumers discussed a drug they had 
seen advertised with their physician,59 half of which received prescriptions.60  
Further, a result of male celebrity testimonials in print and broadcast, sales of 
male impotency products increased to $788 million in 1998, with 
approximately 7.5 million prescriptions being written.61  A National Institute 
for Health Care Management (NIHCM) study also showed that between 1999 
and 2000, prescriptions for the fifty most heavily advertised drugs rose six 
times greater than all other drugs.62  Specifically, Merck’s $160 million 
advertising investment in 2000 netted the company a 360% increase in sales of 
 
 52. See Tamar V. Terzian, Direct-to-Consumer Prescription Drug Advertising, 25 AM. J.L. 
& MED. 149, 157 (1999) (noting physicians feel more pressure from patients to prescribe drugs 
patients have seen advertised); see also ANGELL, supra note 47, at 116 (“You also pay for a 
nearly infinite variety of promotions directed at you.  Here the expectation is that you will ask 
your doctor to prescribe the drugs for you.”). 
 53. Nadal, supra note 10, at 453. 
 54. ANGELL, supra note 47, at 118. 
 55. KATHARINE GREIDER, THE BIG FIX: HOW THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY RIPS OFF 
AMERICAN CONSUMERS 89 (Public Affairs 2003) (stating that Merck spent more advertising 
Vioxx than did Pepsi Cola, Budweiser, Nike, or Campbell’s soups). 
 56. Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1252 (N.J. 1999). 
 57. See ANGELL, supra note 47, at 3; see also Powell, supra note 36, at 62 (Attributing the 
rise in pharmaceutical spending instead to “changing standards of medical care that emphasize 
greater use of medicines, and treatment of previously untreated or undertreated patients”). 
 58. See ANGELL supra note 47, at 3. 
 59. See Impact, supra note 37, pg 5. 
 60. See GREIDER, supra note 56, at 89; see also Powell, supra note 36, at 62 (“Despite 
claims by some critics, there is no evidence that DTC advertising encourages inappropriate 
prescribing of prescription medicines.”). 
 61. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1252. 
 62. See GREIDER, supra note 56, at 89. 
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Vioxx.63  Thus, “the return generated by increasing spending on DTC 
advertising appears to be significant.”64 
Manufacturers argue DTC ads are beneficial because they serve an 
educational function of raising viewers’ awareness of personal health.65  DTC 
proponents suggest a variety of benefits flowing from DTC advertising, 
including the fact that the advertising informs consumers of an existing 
treatment for a certain condition, may cause the consumer to realize he suffers 
from a certain condition by identifying like symptoms, alerts those with 
ailments that a treatment has become available where one previously did not 
exist, and alerts those under treatment that a new more convenient remedy with 
reduced side effects is available.66  Janet Woodcock, Director of the FDA’s 
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, reported in 2003 that “[r]esearch by 
FDA and other entities has documented that accurate [DTC] prescription drug 
promotion can lead to significant increases in the detection of under-treated 
conditions like high blood pressure, diabetes, and depression with consequent 
health benefits for Americans.”67 
Opponents of DTC advertising, however, respond “that the advertisements 
undermine ‘the protection that is a result of requiring a physician to certify a 
patient’s need for a prescription drug.’”68  Further, there is the danger that 
information supplied by manufacturers to consumers is self-interested and 
biased.69  Others believe DTC marketing manipulates consumers because 
“[e]verything is being presented as a wonderdrug.”70  Another opposing 
argument is that DTC ads are contributing to the drastic increases in health 
care costs and spending71 because “[d]octors don’t want to alienate their 
 
 63. See id.; see also Rosenthal et al., Demand Effects of Recent Changes in Prescription 
Drug Promotion, May 29, 2003, available at http://www.kff.org (“every additional $1 the 
industry spent on DTC advertising yielded an additional $4.20 in sales”). 
 64. See Impact, supra note 37, at 8. 
 65. See Alan V. Holmer, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising—Strengthening Our Health Care 
System, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 526, 526-27 (2002). 
 66. See Paul H. Rubin, Ignorance is Death: The FDA’s Advertising Restrictions, in 
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: GOVERNMENT, MARKET PROCESS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 285, 
285-311, 304-05 (Roger D. Feldman ed., 2000). 
 67. Woodcock, supra note 41, at 32. 
 68. Mitchell S. Berger, A Tale of Six Implants: The Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories Norplant 
Case and the Applicability of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine to Direct to Consumer 
Promotion, 55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 525, 566 (2000) (citing Matthew F. Hollon, Direct-to-
Consumer Marketing of Prescription Drugs, 281 JAMA 382, 383-84 (Jan. 27, 1999)). 
 69. See id. 
 70. Id. (citation omitted). 
 71. See The Impact of Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising on Seniors’ Health and Health 
Care Costs, 109th Cong. 92 (2005) (statement of Peter Lurie, M.D., M.P.H., Deputy Director, 
Public Citizen’s Health Research Group) (“Predictably, the cost of health care is being driven up, 
as patients are induced to request newer, more expensive medications instead of equally effective, 
older, generic alternatives.”). 
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patients, and too many of them find it faster and easier to write a prescription 
than to explain why it isn’t necessary.”72 
Consequently, DTC advertising “has generated a direct tort action assault 
on pharmaceutical companies.”73  Litigation centers on the warnings included 
in DTC advertisements and packaging inserts accompanying prescribed 
drugs.74  The issue of manufacturer liability for the failure of the duty to warn 
has specifically focused on the learned intermediary doctrine. 
IV.  THE LEARNED INTERMEDIARY DOCTRINE 
A. Introduction to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
Generally, the learned intermediary doctrine (LID) establishes that 
manufacturers fulfill their duty to warn consumers of product hazards by 
providing accurate warning information to the prescribing physician.75  The 
physician is then charged with providing those warnings to individual 
patients.76  Simply stated, the manufacturer is excused from its duty to warn 
each patient receiving the product when adequate warnings are provided to 
prescribing physicians.77 
Prescribing physicians, therefore, act as “learned intermediaries”78 
between the manufacturer and consumer in relieving the manufacturer of its 
duty to purvey product warnings to the ultimate consumer.79  Such practice 
seems paradoxical to the duty to warn discussed at the start of this comment.  
Instead, the LID is a deviation from the general rule that manufacturers owe a 
 
 72. ANGELL, supra note 47, at 125. 
 73. Jack E. Karns, Direct Advertising of Prescription Drugs: The Duty to Warn and the 
Learned Intermediary Rule, 3 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 273, 274 (2000) (citing In re Norplant 
Contraceptive Prod. Liab. Lit., 165 F.3d 374, 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1999)). 
 74. See id. at 274 (citing In re Norplant, 165 F.3d at 377, 379). 
 75. See In re Norplant, 165 F.3d 364; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 898 (7th ed. 
1999) (“[A] prescription drug manufacturer fulfills its duty to warn of a drug’s potentially 
harmful effects by informing a prescribing physician, rather than the end user, of those effects.”). 
 76. See In re Norplant, 165 F.3d 364. 
 77. See Mark P. Robinson, Jr. & Kevin F. Calcagnie, Vioxx and the Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine, 8 ANDREWS DRUG RECALL LITIG. REP. 7, 1 (2005). 
 78. See id. at 1 (“The term ‘learned intermediary’ is said to have been first articulated in 
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966).  [I]n this case we are dealing with 
a prescription drug rather than a normal consumer item.  In such a case the purchaser’s doctor is a 
learned intermediary between the purchaser and the manufacturer.  If the doctor is properly 
warned of the possibility of a side effect in some patients, and is advised of the symptoms 
normally accompanying the side effect, there is an excellent chance that injury to the patient can 
be avoided.”). 
 79. See Jeffrey E. Grell, Restatement (Third) of Torts, Section 8(D): Back to the Future of 
the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 349, 349 (1996). 
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duty to reasonably warn consumers of a product’s dangers.80  Though a 
manufacturer is relieved of its duty to directly warn consumers, it may be held 
liable for failure to provide adequate warnings to prescribing physicians.81  If 
the manufacturer fails to provide an ‘adequate’82 warning to the learned 
intermediary, it then faces liability directly to the injured patient.83 
These learned intermediary physicians provide information compiled by 
the manufacturer to the patient regarding side effects and other information 
discovered through product research.84  Manufacturers provide product 
information to physicians in two primary methods, through the Physician’s 
Desk Reference or via packaging inserts accompanying the drug, or both.85 
According to Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., the underlying theory 
behind the LID is that: 
Prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and 
varied in effect.  As a medical expert, the prescribing physician can take into 
account the propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his 
patient.  His is a task of weighing the benefits of any medication against its 
potential danger.  The choice he makes is an informed one, an individualized 
medical judgment on knowledge of both patient and palliative.86 
The physician plays such an integral role in a patient’s health care and has a 
relationship with the patient placing him in the best position to warn individual 
patients of potential adverse effects.87  Thus, the LID ensures patients receive 
an independent party’s opinion in determining whether the product’s dangers 
outweigh its benefits88 as “[t]he physician’s role is intended to provoke a 
meaningful discussion between patient and physician prior to making any 
decision to prescribe the drug.”89 
 
 80. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 456-57. 
 81. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc, 734 A.2d 1245, 1255 (N.J. 1999); Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 
153 S.W.3d 758, 764 (Ky. 2004). 
 82. For a discussion on when warnings are deemed adequate, see infra text accompanying 
notes 106-07. 
 83. See Robinson, Jr. & Calcagnie, supra note 78, at 5 (citing McEwen v. Ortho Pharm. 
Corp., 528 P.2d 522, 529 (Or. 1974)) (“Although the duty of the ethical drug manufacturer is to 
warn the doctor, rather than the patient, the manufacturer is directly liable to the patient for a 
breach of such duty.”). 
 84. See Karns, supra note 74, at 276. 
 85. Wolfgruber v. Upjohn Co., 423 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) ( “[W]here the 
warning  given to the prescribing physician by the manufacturer through the Physician’s Desk 
Reference (PDR), packaging inserts and other literature gives specific detailed information on the 
risks of the drug, the manufacturer has been absolved from liability as a matter of law.”). 
 86. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255. 
 87. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 562 n.56. 
 88. See Martin v. Hacker, 628 N.E.2d 1308, 1311 (N.Y. 1933). 
 89. See Karns, supra note 74, at 277. 
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Courts have adopted the LID for four distinct reasons.  First, the 
complexities of medication, the ailments medications treat, and the intricacy of 
the human body preclude average consumers from understanding 
manufacturers’ warnings.90  Second, physicians have specialized training to 
understand the warnings and caution patients accordingly.91  Therefore, 
“information about prescription drugs can best be utilized more effectively by 
physicians than by patients.”92  Third, the LID aids to preserve the traditional 
physician-patient relationship where patients give greater deference to their 
physicians.93  The physician is largely responsible for deciding which drugs to 
prescribe, and the patient must rely on the physician’s choice of medication.94  
As such, “warnings are best directed at the physician rather than at the 
patient.”95  Finally, manufacturers cannot reach all potential consumers and 
therefore cannot effectively convey the necessary warnings while physicians 
have the requisite individualized contact with patients to adequately convey 
product hazards.96  Thus, “[t]his special standard for prescription drugs is an 
understandable exception to the Restatement’s general rule that one who 
markets goods must warn foreseeable ultimate users of dangers inherent in 
[the] products.”97  Guided by these principles, forty-eight states, the District of 
Columbia and Puerto Rico have recognized the LID as an exception to the 
manufacturer’s general duty to warn98  Consequently, product liability actions 
in these jurisdictions will often be confronted with the manufacturer’s LID 
defense. 
 
 90. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 461-62 (citing Hill v. Searle Labs, 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 (8th 
Cir. 1989)). 
 91. See id. 
 92. Ausness, supra note 5, at 109. 
 93. Nadal, supra note 10, at 461-62. 
 94. Ausness, supra note 5, at 108 (citing West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Ark. 
1991) (stating that “the patient relies upon the physician’s judgment in selecting the drug, and the 
patient relies upon the physician’s advice in using the drug.”)). 
 95. Id. at 108-09. 
 96. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 461-62 (citing Hill v. Searle Labs., 884 F.2d 1064, 1070 
(8th Cir. 1989); Martin v. Ortho Pharm Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 357 (Ill. 1996); Brooks v. 
Medtronic, Inc., 750 F.2d 1227, 1232 (4th Cir. 1984); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 
978 (Wash. 1978); Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: Assessing the 
Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 156-59 (1997); Swayze v. McNeil Labs, 807 
F.2d 464, 471 (9th Cir. 1988); Dunkin v. Syntax Labs., 443 F. Supp. 121, 123 (W.D. Tenn. 
1977); Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968)). 
 97. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1254 (N.J. 1999) (quoting Reyes v. Wyeth 
Labs., Inc., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
 98. See Robinson, Jr. & Calcagnie, supra note 78, at 3 (citing In re Norplant Contraceptive 
Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 806 (E.D. Tex. 2002)). 
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B. The Learned Intermediary Doctrine and Consumer Claims Against 
Manufacturers 
“[I]f a prescription drug or medical device causes personal injury, plaintiffs 
typically seek a deep pocket and sue the manufacturer, employing a variety of 
legal theories and claims.”99  In prescription drug actions, the LID 
can have a significant impact upon the ultimate resolution of key issues raised 
in a failure-to-warn claim, including the adequacy of warnings and causation.  
Unlike in most products liability actions, the adequacy of the warning. . . .is 
judged according to its adequacy for the physician, and not the user of the 
product.100 
Most litigation concerning pharmaceuticals does not center around whether 
any warning was provided at all, but rather on the adequacy of that 
manufacturer’s provided warning.101  Thus, considering the LID, a plaintiff 
bringing a product liability claim against a drug manufacturer must first show 
the manufacturer failed to adequately warn the physician of a product risk of 
which the physician was otherwise unaware.102  A plaintiff must also show a 
manufacturer’s failure to warn was both the cause in fact and proximate cause 
of the resulting injuries.103  However, manufacturers typically raise the LID 
defense in a motion for summary judgment, “essentially concluding that: [t]he 
warnings provided were adequate for the physician; and [e]ven if a different or 
better warning had contained the information allegedly absent from the 
warnings already with the product, it would not have altered the physician’s 
decision to prescribe it.”104 
An adequate warning to physicians, and likely to be argued by 
manufacturers, is defined as one “sufficient to apprise the general practitioner 
as well as the ‘unusually sophisticated medical man’ of the dangerous 
propensities of the drug.”105  However, plaintiffs are likely to argue that a 
 
 99. Pham, supra note 47, at 16. 
 100. Robinson, Jr. & Calcagnie, supra note 78, at 1-2. 
 101. Woodside, III & Maggio, supra note 3, at 1 (“Unlike other areas of products liability 
where a case may be based upon a product that was improperly manufactured and does not meet 
specifications, a drug that is subject to litigation is generally properly made in accordance with 
manufacturing standards.”). 
 102. See Guidry v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 835, 840-41 (M.D. La. 2006). 
 103. Woodside, III & Maggio, supra note 3, at 1. 
 104. Robinson, Jr. & Calcagnie, supra note 78, at 5. 
 105. Id.  (citing Parke-Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390, 1400 (8th Cir. 1969)); Jury 
Instructions, Cona v. Merck & Co., 2005 WL 3965213, at *5, *9 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2005) 
(“To be adequate, the warning or instruction must be the kind of warning or instruction which a 
reasonable prudent manufacturer in the same or similar circumstances would have provided to the 
prescribing physician. . . .When deciding if an adequate warning was given by the defendant you 
should look at the totality of the information given to the physicians about the drug and its risks, 
including information given in the package insert, in the published articles, in the promotional 
materials and the information provided by Merck’s sales representatives.”). 
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manufacturer has a duty to warn of all potential product dangers it knows or 
should know exist, and “that a warning must be correct, complete and fully 
descriptive, and it must convey updated information as to all of the drug’s 
known side effects.”106  Further, the mere mentioning of a side effect will not 
relieve the defendant from liability if the degree of the associated risk is 
inadequately conveyed.107 
A plaintiff must also establish the element of causation, “that an adequate 
warning would have persuaded the physician not to prescribe the drug.”108  
Naturally, manufacturers will argue the warning was not the proximate cause 
of the claimant’s injuries and that a varied warning would not have dissuaded 
the physician from prescribing the drug.109  If a manufacturer meets its burden 
of proof regarding a warning’s adequacy, without some evidence to the 
contrary, “courts are not reluctant to grant summary judgment.”110 
Therefore, the LID only provides an affirmative defense to manufacturers 
if adequate warnings have been provided to prescribing physicians.  However, 
various circumstances demand exceptions to the LID be created where 
manufacturers cannot be absolved from liability. 
C. Exceptions to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine 
Various exceptions to the LID have been written into the Restatement 
(Third) and adopted by courts.111  With each exception to the doctrine, the 
manufacturer is required to warn consumers directly.112  First, warnings must 
be provided directly to consumers when “the manufacturer knows or has 
reason to know that health care providers will not be in a position to reduce the 
risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings.”113  Courts and 
the Restatement specifically recognize this exception in the circumstance of a 
mass immunization.114  Courts recognize the provider is not acting “in the 
same learned intermediary role” as when prescribing drugs to an individual 
 
 106. Robinson, Jr. & Calcagnie, supra note 78, at 5 (citing Martin v. Hacker, 628 N.E.2d 
1308 (N.Y. 1993); Krasnopolskyv. Warner-Lambert Co., 799 F. Supp. 1342, 1345-46 (E.D.N.Y. 
1992) (stating the manufacturer’s duty to warn continues even after the product has reached the 
market, i.e. there is a duty to warn of risks discovered after market release)). 
 107. See id. (citing Stahl v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., 283 F.3d 254, 267 (5th Cir. 2002); 
McDonnell v. Chelsea Mfrs. Inc., 687 N.Y.S.2d 172, 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)). 
 108. Id. at 6; see also West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 613 (Ark. 1991) (stating 
patients rely on physicians’ judgment in selecting and using drugs). 
 109. Robinson, Jr. & Calcagnie, supra note 78, at 6. 
 110. Id. (citing Carter v. TAP Pharms. Inc., 2004 WL 2550593 (W.D. Tex. 2004)). 
 111. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. e 
(1998). 
 112. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 463. 
 113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d)(2) (1998). 
 114. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d)(2) cmt. e (1998). 
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patient115 and that “no physician-patient relationship is created and ‘the drug is 
not administered as a prescription drug.’”116  Thus, the physician is not acting 
as a learned intermediary in instances of mass immunization and the LID will 
not protect manufacturers against claims for product liability. 
The Restatement (Third) suggests two other exceptions to the LID,117 
though qualifying that “[t]he Institute leaves to developing case law whether 
exceptions to the learned intermediary rule, in these or other situations, should 
be recognized.”118  The first of the Restatement’s proposed exceptions to the 
LID would apply where FDA regulations require direct warnings be given to 
consumers.119  As an example, comment e notes that birth control pills are 
required to be sold with a “patient package insert” listing product warnings, 
and therefore the LID would not apply to these products.120  The proposed 
FDA mandate exception has been recognized by a handful of courts who 
determined oral contraceptives differ from ordinary prescriptions because the 
patient herself chooses which contraceptive to take, and she does not largely 
depend on the prescribing physician.121 
 
 115. Karns, supra note 74, at 278 (citing  Allison v. Merck & Co., Inc., 878 P.2d 948, 959 
(Nev. 1994); Cunningham v. Pfizer & Co., Inc., 532 P.2d 1377, 1381 (Okla. 1975); Brazzell v. 
United States, 788 F.2d 1352, 1358 (8th Cir. 1986); Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1275-
76 (5th Cir. 1974)). 
 116. Karns, supra note 74, at 276. 
 117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. e (1998) 
(“Although the learned intermediary rule is generally accepted and a drug manufacturer fulfills its 
legal obligation to warn by providing adequate warnings to the health-care provider, arguments 
have been advanced that in two other areas courts should consider imposing tort liability on drug 
manufacturers that fail to provide direct warnings to consumers.  In the first, governmental 
regulatory agencies have mandated that patients be informed of risks attendant to the use of a 
drug.  A noted example is the FDA requirement that birth control pills be sold to patients 
accompanied by a patient package insert. In the second, manufacturers have advertised a 
prescription drug and its indicated use in the mass media. Governmental regulations require that, 
when drugs are so advertised, they must be accompanied by appropriate information concerning 
risk so as to provide balanced advertising.”). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.; see also Wagner & Peterson, supra note 25, at 236. 
 121. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 466-69 (citing In re Norplant Contraceptive Prod. Litig., 
165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1999); Odom v. Searle & Co., 979 F.2d 1001, 1003 (4th Cir. 1992); 
Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1980); MacPherson v. Searle & Co., 
775 F. Supp. 417, 422 (D.D.C. 1991); Reaves v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 765 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 
(E.D. Mich. 1991); Zanzuri v. G.D. Searle & Co., 748 F. Supp. 1511, 1514-15 (S.D. Fla. 1990); 
Allen v. G.D. Searle & Co., 748 F. Supp. 1142, 1147-48 (D. Or. 1989); Spychala v. G.D. Searle 
& Co., 705 F. Supp. 1024, 1031 (D.N.J. 1988); Kociemba v. Searle & Co., 680 F. Supp. 1293, 
1305-06 (D. Minn. 1988); Goodson v. Searle Labs., 471 F. Supp. 546, 548-49 (D. Conn. 1978); 
Chambers v. G.D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377, 381 (D. Md. 1975); West v. Searle & Co., 806 
S.W.2d 608, 614 (Ark. 1991); Lacy v. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398, 401 (Del. 1989); Martin v. 
Ortho Pharm. Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 356-57 (Ill. 1996); Cobb v. Syntex Labs., 444 So. 2d 203, 
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More importantly for the focus of this comment, the Restatement suggests 
an argument is being made, in light of increasing DTC advertising, that the 
LID should not apply when manufacturers advertise directly to the public.122  
“This exception to the [LID] mandates a change in the warning standard.  
Warnings must be pitched toward the reasonably prudent patient-consumer 
rather than the prescribing physician.”123  The DTC exception was the focus of 
Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc.,124 where the New Jersey Supreme Court 
was the first to create an exception to the LID for manufacturers who engage in 
DTC advertising.125 
D. Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc. 
In 1999 the New Jersey Supreme Court became the first court to hold the 
LID does not apply to pharmaceutical companies who engage in DTC 
advertising.126  In Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., several women who 
underwent surgical insertion of Norplant, a contraceptive employing six 
caplets implanted under the skin of the upper arm, brought product liability 
claims against the manufacturer for failure to warn of potential side effects.127 
Wyeth began an advertising campaign in 1991 that directed the 
contraceptive at women, rather than physicians, on television and in magazines 
“such as Glamour, Mademoiselle, and Cosmopolitan.”128  Many women 
allegedly suffered pain and scarring due to the implants and claimed aggressive 
consumer directed advertising influenced their decision to seek Norplant.129  
 
205 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co., 423 N.E.2d 831, 836-37 (Ohio 1981); 
McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21, 24 (Okla. 1982); Taurino v. Ellen, 579 A.2d 925, 935 (Pa. Super. 
Ct. 1990); Terhune v. A.H. Robins Co., 577 P.2d 975, 978-79 (Wash. 1978); In re Norplant 
Contraceptive Prod. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1999); Lindsay v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 
637 F.2d 87, 91-92 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
 122. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1251 (N.J. 1999); Wagner & Peterson, 
supra note 25, at 237; Karns, supra note 74, at 285. 
 123. Karns, supra note 74, at 285 (citing MacDonald v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 475 N.E.2d 65, 
68 (Mass. 1985)). 
 124. See Perez, 734 A.2d 1245. 
 125. See Nadal, supra note 10, at 457. 
 126. See generally Perez, 734 A.2d 1245. 
 127. See id. at 1247. The court also stated: 
Plaintiffs’ principal claim alleged that Wyeth, distributors of Norplant in the United 
States, failed to warn adequately about side effects associated with the contraceptive.  
Side effects complained of by plaintiffs included weight gain, headaches, dizziness, 
nausea, diarrhea, acne, vomiting, fatigue, facial hair growth, numbness in the arms and 
legs, irregular menstruation, hair loss, leg cramps, anxiety and nervousness, vision 
problems anemia, mood swings and depression, high blood pressure, and removal 
complications that resulted in scarring. 
Id. at 1248. 
 128. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1248 (N.J. 1999). 
 129. See id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] “ASK YOUR DOCTOR IF THIS PRODUCT IS RIGHT FOR YOU” 439 
Plaintiffs further stated that no advertisement warned of the product’s dangers 
but instead claimed its simplicity and convenience.130  Wyeth, arguing based 
on the LID and the New Jersey Products Liability Act, claimed it had no duty 
to warn consumers directly, but instead was only required to provide warnings 
to physicians, which claimants failed to prove were inadequate.131 
Relying on the LID, the trial court held “the physician retains the duty to 
weigh the benefits and risks associated with a drug before deciding whether the 
drug is appropriate for the patient” and that the plaintiffs failed to show the 
warnings provided to physicians were inadequate.132  The intermediate 
appellate court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the 
basis of the learned intermediary doctrine.133 
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed and held Wyeth in fact had a duty 
to directly warn consumers, stating: 
We believe that when mass marketing of prescription drugs seeks to influence 
a patient’s choice of a drug, a pharmaceutical manufacturer that makes direct 
claims to consumers for the efficacy of its product should not be unqualifiedly 
relieved of a duty to provide proper warnings of the dangers or side effects of 
the product.134 
Thus, drug manufacturers making product claims directly to consumers could 
no longer satisfy their duty to warn by providing physicians with product 
warnings.135  The court expressed general concerns regarding the practice of 
DTC advertising136 and noted the marketing strategy was intended to pressure 
consumers to ask physicians for the specific products and that the 
advertisements rarely informed consumers of accompanying risks.137 
In reaching its decision, the court turned to the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts which left the DTC exception to “developing case law.”138  The court 
accepted the Restatement’s invitation to create a DTC exception when 
interpreting section 6(d) language “when the manufacturer knows or has 
reason to know that health-care providers will not be in a position to reduce the 
risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings.”139 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 1249. 
 132. Id. at 1248. 
 133. Id. at 1249. 
 134. Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1247 (N.J. 1999). 
 135. Ausness, supra note 5, at 116. 
 136. Perez, 734 A.2d at 1251-53. 
 137. Id. at 1251-52. 
 138. Id. at 1253; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) 
cmt. e. (1999). 
 139. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d)(2) (1999). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
440 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:421 
The court also examined the four premises underlying the LID140 and 
stated that changes in national health care, coupled with DTC advertising, 
resulted in several being inapplicable.141  Specifically, the court stated the 
traditional physician-patient relationship began to dissolve with the advent of 
managed care organizations (MCOs)142 and the doctrine of informed consent 
as patients and insurance companies began making more health care 
decisions.143  Managed care programs reduced the physician’s time with 
patients and thus his ability to adequately inform patients of drug risks.144  
Further, given the $1.3 billion manufacturers spent on DTC ads in 1998, the 
court believed “drug manufacturers can hardly be said to ‘lack effective means 
to communicate directly with patients’ when their advertising campaigns can 
pay off in close to billions in dividends.”145 
Thus, in concluding that the LID does not apply to manufacturers engaging 
in DTC advertising, the court stated: 
When all of its premises are absent, as when direct warnings to consumers are 
mandatory, the [LID], “itself an exception to the manufacturer’s traditional 
duty to warn consumers directly of the risk associated with any product, 
simply drops out of the calculus, leaving the duty of the manufacturer to be 
determined in accordance with the general principles of tort law.”146 
 
 140. The four underlying premises for the LID, as stated in Perez are: preserving the patient-
physician relationship; physicians are in a better position to provide information to patients; drug 
manufacturers’ lack of effective means to communicate to consumers; and given the complexity 
of risk information, manufacturers would be strained to provide adequate warnings to lay 
patients.  See supra text accompanying notes 85-90. 
 141. See Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1255 (N.J. 1999); see also id. 
(“Consumer-directed advertising of pharmaceuticals thus belies each of the premises on which 
the learned intermediary doctrine rests.”). 
 142. MCOs, or Managed Care Organizations, are corporate organizations which contract 
physicians into preferred networks for their insured’s use.  In exchange for proving the MCO 
lower rates, physicians receive increased patient clientele.  Specific types of MCOs include 
Health Management Organizations (HMOs) and Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs). 
 143. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255; see also id. at 1257 (“Patient choice is an increasingly 
important part of our medical-legal jurisprudence. . . .Accordingly, a patient must be informed of 
material risks, which exist ‘when a reasonable patient, in what the physician knows or should 
know to be the patient’s position, would be ‘likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of 
risks’ in deciding whether to forego the proposed therapy or to submit to it.’” (citation omitted)). 
 144. See id. at 1255; see also Bernard J. Garbutt, III and Melinda E. Hoffman, Recent 
Developments in Pharmaceutical Products Liability Law: Failure to Warn, The Learned 
Intermediary Defense, and Other Issues in the New Millennium, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 269, 274 
(2003) (“As a result of this new system, patients have less freedom in their choice of doctors, and 
doctors have monetary incentives to reduce costs of treatment and to crowd more patients into 
their schedule, thereby lessening the amount of time spent with each patient.”). 
 145. See Perez, 734 A.2d at 1255-56 (citing Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to 
Consumers: Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 158 (1997)). 
 146. Id. at 1256 (quoting Edwards v. Basel Pharms., 116 F. 3d 1341, 343 (10th Cir. 1997)). 
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Attempting to prevent manufacturers from facing absolute liability when 
engaging in DTC advertising, the Perez court adopted a rebuttable presumption 
that if a manufacturer complied with FDA advertising and warning regulations, 
it would not fail its duty to warn.147  “The court thus recognized that a 
pharmaceutical manufacturer’s compliance with FDA regulations, including 
regulations related to DTC marketing campaigns, may shield it in a failure to 
warn case.”148 
E. Arguments in Favor a Direct-to-Consumer Exception to the LID 
Critics to the LID advance several arguments against applying the doctrine 
to manufacturers employing DTC.  Specifically, they argue DTC advertising 
has eroded the traditional patient-physician relationship because patients no 
longer passively defer to their physicians regarding treatment suggestions and 
orders.149  Accordingly, the increased disjoint is attributable to DTC 
advertising in that “drug companies have given consumers better access to 
information about treatment options.”150  Also contended is that the rise of the 
managed care era has further deteriorated the traditional patient-physician 
relationship.151  Because MCOs bargain with drug manufacturers for lower 
prices in exchange for excluding competitors’ products, MCO physicians have 
less discretion in choosing which drugs to prescribe.152  Also a perceived 
product of DTC advertisements is that patients pressure MCO physicians to 
prescribe specific medications on threats of seeking treatment elsewhere.153 
Proponents of the exception also argue that drug manufacturers should not 
be held to a lesser duty than manufacturers of all other consumer goods.154  
They also argue that the marketing schemes employed by manufacturers 
resemble those of all other consumer goods.155  Specifically, critics purport the 
marketing of lifestyle drugs “plays upon the personal insecurities and vanities 
of listeners or viewers.”156 
 
 147. Woodside, III & Maggio, supra note 3, at 12. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Ausness, supra note 5, at 120. 
 150. Id. (stating that drug manufacturers also provide potential customers with free videos, 
brochures and information packets about products along with having websites and toll free 
numbers available twenty-four hours a day). 
 151. Chester Chuang, Note, Is There A Doctor in the House? Using Failure-to-Warn Liability 
to Enhance the Safety of Online Prescribing, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1452, 1455 (2000). 
 152. Charles J. Walsh et al., The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: The Correct Prescription 
for Drug Labeling, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 821, 876 (1995). 
 153. See Yonni D. Fushman, Perez v. Wyeth, Inc.: Toward Creating a Direct-to-Consumer 
Advertisement Exception to the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 80 B.U. L. Rev. 1161, 1172 
(2000). 
 154. Ausness, supra note 5, at 122. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
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Many arguments are also advanced as to how DTC advertising furthers the 
public good and how a DTC exception would create more harm than good.157  
According to a 2003 statement by the Federal Trade Commission: 
[DTC advertising] can empower consumers to manage their own health care 
by providing information that will help them, with the assistance of their 
doctors, to make better informed decisions about their treatment 
options. . . .Consumers receive these benefits from DTC advertising with little, 
if any, evidence that such advertising increases prescription drug prices.158 
A 2002 survey by Prevention Magazine found 24.8 million Americans 
consulted with their physician regarding medical conditions for the first time as 
a result of seeing a DTC advertisement.159  Further, a 2002 FDA survey 
showed 43% of respondents sought additional information about a drug, 
conditions it treats, or general health after viewing a DTC advertisement.160  
The largest source of the additional information was the patient’s physician.161 
No doubt the rise of MCOs and DTC has impacted the patient-physician 
relationship and awareness of ailments and available treatments.  However, to 
argue changes in advertising techniques and health coverage have so 
augmented the relationship as to require manufacturers to individually warn 
each consumer of the list of product hazards is impracticable.  Further, 
research shows DTC advertising increases patient-physician contact and 
questions regarding conditions and general health.  Thus, DTC advertising 
appears to have helped promote the public’s general health. 
Although marketing schemes and insurance plans have changed, the 
physician’s role as final decision-maker in writing the prescription has not and 
 
 157. See Laurie K. Marshall, Keeping the Duty to Warn Patients of the Risks and Side Effects 
of Mass-Marketed Prescription Drugs Where it Belongs: With Their Physician, 26 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 95, 97 (2000). 
 158. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Doc. No. 2003N-0344, COMMENTS BEFORE THE 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, IN THE 
MATTER OF REQUEST FOR COMMENTS ON CONSUMER-DIRECTED PROMOTION 3 (2003). 
 159. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Doc. No. 2002N-0209, COMMENTS OF THE STAFF OF 
THE BUREAU OF ECONOMICS, THE BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND THE OFFICE OF 
POLICY PLANNING OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, IN THE MATTER OF REQUEST FOR 
COMMENT ON FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES 3 (2002) (citing Prevention, Fifth Annual Survey: 
Consumer Reaction to DTC Advertising of Prescription Medicines 2001/2002 at 3 (“Consumer 
surveys suggest that DTC advertising has stimulated discussions between doctors and patients, 
encouraged consumers to learn more about previously undiagnosed conditions, and not prevented 
doctors from recommending non-drug therapies.”)).  
 160. KATHRYN J. AIKIN ET AL., EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: PATIENT AND PHYSICIAN ATTITUDES 
AND BEHAVIORS ASSOCIATED WITH DTC PROMOTION OF PRESCRIPTION DRUGS—SUMMARY OF 
SURVEY RESEARCH RESULTS 3 (2004). 
 161. Id.  Also stating that “[t]he most commonly reported sources of this additional 
information were healthcare providers.  Eighty-nine percent (89%) of respondents reported 
obtaining information from their doctors.” Id. 
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“the justifications for the doctrine are as valid today as they were when it was 
created.”162  If a DTC exception was universally adopted, and drug companies 
were to warn individual consumers, the exception would first be premised on 
the fact that consumers would read the warning and refrain from taking the 
product if they deem it unsuitable.163  A doubtful result. 
V.  POST PEREZ V. WYETH LABORATORIES, INC. 
Following the Perez decision, courts in jurisdictions around the country 
have been reluctant, at best, to heed the invitation of the Restatement to 
delineate an exception to the LID on the basis of manufacturers engaging in 
DTC advertising.  The court in In re Meridia addressed the fact that few courts 
have followed in New Jersey’s footsteps and stated, “[f]ive years have passed 
since the New Jersey Supreme Court decided Perez. In the intervening period, 
no other state has followed New Jersey’s lead.  The court thus could not apply 
Perez’s logic even if it desired to do so.”164  The exception recognized in Perez 
has yet to be recognized by any other court.  Although the Perez decision 
remains a strong plaintiff’s argument, most jurisdictions have yet to address 
the applicability of the LID to manufacturers engaging in DTC advertising.165 
Facing an almost identical situation as Perez, the court in In re Norplant 
Contraceptive Products Liability Litigation explicitly declined to create a DTC 
exception to the LID and granted the defendant manufacturer’s motion for 
summary judgment.166  In the class action suit, the court stated, “the 
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions to address the issue apply the [LID] to 
define a pharmaceutical company’s duty to warn of risks associated with the 
use of a prescription drug.”167  The plaintiffs argued the LID was not 
applicable to their claim because Wyeth engaged in DTC advertising.168  The 
court disagreed with the plaintiffs and stated, “This argument. . . .lacks merit in 
 
 162. Woodside, III & Maggio, supra note 3, at 13. 
 163. Ausness, supra note 5, at 137. 
 164. In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. Supp. 2d 791, 812 n.19 (N.D. Ohio 2004). 
 165. Pham, supra note 47, at 17; In re Norplant Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 805 
(E.D. Tex. 2002). 
 166. In re Norplant, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 833-34 (“Plaintiffs have failed to produce evidence 
overcoming the doctrine in that they do not show that the purportedly inadequate warnings on 
Norplant’s labeling were either a producing cause of and/or proximately caused Plaintiffs [sic] 
subsequent injuries.  Nor do they proffer evidence confirming that any of Plaintiffs’ treating 
healthcare providers would not have prescribed Norplant had the labeling been different.  
Defendants, however, provide the affidavit of Dr. Anita Nelson, which establishes that the 
healthcare providers who prescribed Norplant were aware of the 26 ‘Adverse Reactions. . . . 
[T]his motion is GRANTED as to all Plaintiffs who claim they suffer any of the 26 ‘Adverse 
Reactions.’”). 
 167. Id. at 805 (court provides a list of states, and the controlling authority, that have adopted 
the LID). 
 168. See id. at 827. 
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all jurisdictions, except New Jersey. . . .apart from New Jersey, [DTC] 
advertising does not negate the applicability of the [LID].”169  However, ten 
plaintiffs’ claims out of the 2,966 were governed by New Jersey substantive 
law and were exempt from the summary judgment motion.170  The court held 
the LID did apply and focused its discussion on the fact that “[p]laintiffs did 
not create a fact issue on causation because the evidence fails to show that any 
of the healthcare providers cited by the Plaintiffs were unaware of the 26 side 
effects.”171  The court in an earlier 1999 Norplant opinion gave special 
attention to the fact that the physician played an integral role in prescribing the 
drug and educating patients about risks and benefits of using the Norplant 
contraceptive.172 
Further, the court in Albertson v. Wyeth, Inc. stated, “it would be 
improvident to accede to plaintiffs’ argument that a limited exception to the 
learned intermediary doctrine should be created based upon direct-to-consumer 
advertising.”173  The court believed that dissemination through the media 
concerning the drugs does not increase the patient’s ability to acquire the drugs 
because a prescription is still required.174  As has been seen by “developing 
case law,” courts have not followed, and correctly so, the Restatement’s 
suggestion that a DTC exception to the LID be created. 
VI.  FEDERAL REGULATIONS OF PHARMACEUTICAL ADVERTISEMENTS 
A. Current FDA Regulation of Prescription Drug Advertisements 
The Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) authority to regulate the sale, 
manufacture, and distribution of drugs exists under the Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act (FDCA).175  Specifically, FDCA section 502(n), codified as 21 
U.S.C. § 352(n), grants the FDA the authority to regulate prescription drug 
advertisements.176  Implementation of the advertisement regulation authority 
 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 829. 
 171. In re Norplant Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 826 (E.D. Tex. 2002). 
 172. In re Norplant Contraceptive Prod. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 1999). 
 173. Albertson v. Wyeth, Inc., 2003 WL 21544488, at *10-11. 
 174. Id. 
 175. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000). 
 176. Woodcock, supra note 41, at 35; 28 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2000) (“In the case of any 
prescription drug distributed or offered for sale in any State, unless the manufacturer, packer, or 
distributor thereof includes in all advertisements and other descriptive printed matter issued or 
caused to be issued by the manufacturer, packer, or distributor with respect to that drug a true 
statement of (1) the established name as defined in paragraph (e) of this section, printed  
prominently and in type at least half as large as that used for any trade or brand name thereof, (2) 
the formula showing quantitatively each ingredient of such drug to the extent required for labels 
under paragraph (e) of this section, and (3) such other information in brief summary relating to 
side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness as shall be required in regulations which shall be 
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rests with the Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communications 
(DDMAC), within the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (CDER).177  
The specific rules and requirements promulgated to govern drug 
advertisements are contained in 21 C.F.R. § 202.1.  However, “[c]onsistent 
with the First Amendment, FDA may only regulate prescription advertising 
that is false or misleading.”178  Nothing in the FDCA prohibits DTC 
advertising.179 
The FDA regulates advertisements and promotional materials created by 
the product’s manufacturer, packer or distributor.180  This includes materials 
placed in publication by product sponsors directed to consumers, including: 
“ads printed in magazines, journals and newspapers; ads broadcast over 
television, radio or telephone; brochures, letters and flyers sent through the 
mail; videotapes and pharmacy counter displays, billboards and patient 
compliance programs.”181 
The FDA regulates those advertisements that discuss a drug’s effectiveness 
and use,182 which may include two of the three ads used by product sponsors to 
communicate to consumers, “product-claim” and “reminder” ads.183  
Advertisements stating a drug’s benefits must also contain a “fair balance” of 
the drug’s “risks and limitations of efficacy.”184  Product claim ads are those 
providing the product’s name and use or make a representation about the 
drug.185  Reminder ads are those disclosing the product’s name and some piece 
of descriptive information, (i.e. dosage method or price information) but 
 
issued by the Secretary in accordance with the procedure specified in section 371(e) of this title, 
except that (A) in extraordinary circumstances, no regulation issued under this paragraph shall 
require prior approval by the Secretary of the content of any advertisement, and (B) no 
advertisement of a prescription drug, published after the effective date of regulations issued under 
this paragraph applicable to advertisements of prescription drugs, shall with respect to the matters 
specified in this paragraph or covered by such regulations, be subject to the provisions of sections 
52 to 57 of title 15. This paragraph (n) shall not be applicable to any printed matter which the 
Secretary determines to be labeling as defined in section 321(m) of this title. Nothing in the 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, signed at Vienna, Austria, on February 21, 1971, shall 
be construed to prevent drug price communications to consumers.”). 
 177. Woodcock, supra note 41, at 33. 
 178. Behrman, supra note 48, at 11. 
 179. Woodcock, supra note 41, at 35. 
 180. Id. at 33. 
 181. Id.; 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e) (1999) (providing a general description of the various types of 
regulated advertisements as well as a list of those that are exempt). 
 182. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1). 
 183. Woodcock, supra note 41, at 34 (“The third type, ‘help-seeking’ ads, are not regulated 
by FDA.  Help-seeking ads are those discussing a disease or condition and advising the audience 
to ask their doctor.  These ads are not required to disclose any risk information because no 
product was mentioned or implied.”). 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
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cannot also disclose the product’s use or “make any claims or representations 
about the product.”186  Thus, the FDA primarily regulates product claim ads.187 
FDA regulations under the FDCA require all prescription drug 
advertisements contain “information in brief summary relating to side effects, 
contraindications, and effectiveness” of the pharmaceutical.188  To meet this 
mandate, the FDCA distinguishes between print and broadcast advertisements.  
Print advertisements must contain a brief summary of all risks associated with 
the product.189  Manufacturers can meet FDA’s brief summary requirement 
merely by printing the packaging insert information into the advertisement’s 
text.190 
Advertisements for broadcast over television, radio, or telephone, on the 
other hand, must disclose the “major side effects and contraindications of the 
advertised drugs in the audio or audio and visual parts of the presentation.”191  
 
 186. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (e)(2)(i) (“Reminder advertisements., Reminder advertisements are 
those which call attention to the name of the drug product but do not include indications or 
dosage recommendations for use of the drug product. These reminder advertisements shall 
contain only the proprietary name of the drug product, if any; the established name of the drug 
product, if any; the established name of each active ingredient in the drug product; and, 
optionally, information relating to quantitative ingredient statements, dosage form, quantity of 
package contents, price, the name and address of the manufacturer, packer, or distributor or other 
written, printed, or graphic matter containing no representation or suggestion relating to the 
advertised drug product.”); see Woodcock, supra note 41, at 33. 
 187. Ausness, supra note 5, at 102. 
 188. 21 C.F.R. § 201.1(e)(4)(i)(a) (“Substance of information to be included in brief 
summary., An advertisement for a prescription drug covered by a new-drug application approved 
pursuant to section 505 of the act after October 10, 1962 or section 512 of the act after August 1, 
1969, or any approved supplement thereto, shall not recommend or suggest any use that is not in 
the labeling accepted in such approved new-drug application or supplement. The advertisement 
shall present information from labeling required, approved, or permitted in a new-drug 
application relating to each specific side effect and contraindication in such labeling that relates to 
the uses of the advertised drug dosage form(s) or shall otherwise conform to the provisions of 
paragraph (e)(3)(iii) of this section.”); see also 21 C.F.R. § 201.1(e)(3)(iii) (“The information 
relating to side effects and contraindications shall disclose each specific side effect and 
contraindication (which include side effects, warnings, precautions, and contraindications and 
include any such information under such headings as cautions, special considerations, important 
notes, etc.; see paragraph (e)(1) of this section) contained in required, approved, or permitted 
labeling for the advertised drug dosage form(s). . .”); Nadal, supra note 10, at 482; see generally 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, GUIDANCE 
FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS (1999) [hereinafter 
GUIDANCE]. 
 189. 21 C.F.R. § 201.1(e)(i); see Hill, supra note 46, at 364. 
 190. See Ausness, supra note 5, at 102. 
 191. 21 C.F.R. § 201.1(e)(i) (Advertisements broadcast through media such as radio, 
television, or telephone communications systems shall include information relating to the major 
side effects and contraindications of the advertised drugs in the audio or audio and visual parts of 
the presentation and unless adequate provision is made for dissemination of the approved or 
permitted package labeling in connection with the broadcast presentation shall contain a brief 
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This is known as a “major statement.”  Thus, the “brief summary” requires 
disclosure of all information regarding all known side effects and 
contraindications whereas the “major statement” merely requires a statement of 
those major side effects.  Although broadcast advertisements must only 
provide the major statement in the ad itself, advertisers are still required to 
make the brief summary or make one available.192  The short duration of 
broadcast advertisement medium, however, does not support the required 
“brief summaries” in the advertisements.193  Sponsors, therefore, “must make 
an ‘adequate provision for the [sic] dissemination of the approved package 
labeling in connection with the broadcast presentation.’”194  Through the 
“adequate provision” requirement195 sponsors must provide a means by which 
“most of a potentially diverse audience [would] have reasonably convenient 
access to the advertised product’s approved labeling” (i.e. the brief 
summary).196  Specifically, sponsors can meet this requirement by a disclosure 
in the advertisement of all of the following: a toll-free number consumers can 
call and obtain labeling information, an internet web page address providing 
access to the labeling, where to obtain a print advertisement containing the 
brief summary, and disclosure in the advertisement that healthcare providers 
can provide additional information.197  “The regulations thus specify that the 
major statement together with adequate provision for dissemination of the 
product’s approved labeling can provide the information disclosure required 
for broadcast advertisements.”198 
B. Development of Regulation of DTC Advertising 
With the passage of amendments to the FDCA in 1962, the FDA could 
officially regulate prescription drug advertising.199  DTC advertising was used 
on a small scale prior to 1983, and was usually present via print advertisements 
as a result of the medium’s ease and ability to provide a cost-effective means 
of disseminating the mandated brief summary.200  With manufacturers 
preparing DTC campaigns, the FDA imposed a two year moratorium on DTC 
advertising to “investigate the effects such advertising on consumers and the 
 
summary of all necessary information related to side effects and contraindications.); see also 
GUIDANCE, supra note 189. 
 192. GUIDANCE, supra note 189, at 1. 
 193. Nadal, supra note 10, at 482. 
 194. Id. (citing 21 C.F.R. § 201.1(e)(1)). 
 195. GUIDANCE, supra note 189, at 1. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 2-3. 
 198. Id. at 1-2. 
 199. Hill, supra note 46, at 363. 
 200. Id. at 363-64. 
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efficacy of then-existing FDA regulations.”201  In September 1985, the FDA 
lifted the moratorium on DTC advertising, concluding “current regulations 
governing prescription drug advertising provide sufficient safeguards to protect 
consumers.”202  Thus, manufacturers could advertise directly to consumers 
under the then existing FDA regulations controlling marketing of prescription 
drugs to physicians.203 
Prior to 1997, pharmaceutical manufacturers rarely employed broadcast 
advertisements as the FDA required full disclosure of side effects in the ad 
itself.204 “That made thirty-second spots difficult—and even 
counterproductive.”205  In 1997, however, FDA issued a draft guidance entitled 
Guidance for Industry: Consumer-Directed Broadcast Advertisements206 
which described changes in the rules governing broadcast advertisements.207  
Subsequently, advertisers were only required to provide the major statement to 
refer viewers to the four sources where consumers could obtain additional 
information (web address, print ad, physician and toll-free number) and where 
a full disclosure may be found.208  Following the 1997 change, “drug 
companies began to flood the airwaves with commercials about their latest 
drugs.  Expenditures on DTC ads nearly tripled between 1997 and 2001, and 
the percentage accounted for by television increased from 25% to 64%.”209 
Through a post-marketing submission requirement, advertisers are required 
by the FDCA to submit all DTC advertisements to the FDA when a new 
campaign is launched.210  Some manufacturers, on the other hand, have agreed 
to submit promotions to the FDA before public release.211  Within the FDA, 
the Division of Drug Marketing, Advertising and Communications (DDMAC) 
is responsible for reviewing drug promotional materials.212  DDMAC ensures 
the promotions portray a “fair balance” of risks and benefits and contain “true 
statements” as required by the FDCA.213  A fair balance exists “if the 
 
 201. Id. 
 202. William E. Holtz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising: Effects on Public 
Health, 13 J.L. & HEALTH 199, 202 (1999) (citing Direct-to-Consumer Advertising of 
Prescription Drugs; Withdrawal of Moratorium, 50 Fed. Reg. 36, 677 (1985)). 
 203. Hill, supra note 46, at 363. 
 204. ANGELL, supra note 47, at 123-24. 
 205. Id. 
 206. See generally GUIDANCE, supra note 189. 
 207. Hill, supra note 46, at 362-63. 
 208. GUIDANCE, supra note 189, at 1-3. 
 209. ANGELL, supra note 47, at 123-24. 
 210. Behrman, supra note 48, at 20. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 19. 
 213. Hill, supra note 46, at 365; 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(1) (1999) (“All advertisements for any 
prescription drug . . . shall present a true statement of information in brief summary relating to 
side effects, contraindications, and effectiveness.”). 
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presentation of true information relating to side effects and contraindications is 
comparable in depth and detail with the claims for effectiveness and safety.”214  
If an advertisement is false or misleading as to side effects or effectiveness, 
does not provide the mandated “fair balance,” or fails to disclose risks of non-
recommended uses of a drug, then the advertisement will not present the 
required “true statement.”215  DDMAC’s options with regards to false or 
misleading advertisements include: (1) untitled letters providing notice of 
violations and a request that the violative materials be discontinued; (2) 
warning letters issued for more serious violations which may pose serious 
public health risks; (3) injunctions and consent decrees; (4) referrals for 
criminal investigation or prosecution; and (5) seizures.216  DDMAC received 
for review roughly 31,600 promotional materials in 1999, 32,100 in 2000, 
34,200 in 2001, 36,700 in 2002, 40,000 in 2003, and 52,800 in 2004.217  
Advertisements in violation of FDA regulations are subject to being 
immediately stopped and can also require the sponsor to release a remedial 
campaign to correct misrepresentations.218 
According to Janet Woodcock, Director of the FDA’s Center for Drug 
Evaluation and Research, the purpose of FDA regulation of DTC advertising is 
ensuring the ads remain positively balanced.219 
[T]here are three important things to understand about FDA’s authority in this 
area.  First, the statute and the regulations focus on the content, not the 
existence, of prescription drug promotion.  Second, the law does not make a 
distinction between target audiences.  The law has never prohibited advertising 
prescription drugs to consumers.  However, until the early 1980’s this was just 
not done.  Third, the act specifically forbids requiring preclearance of ads by 
the FDA, except under extraordinary circumstances.220 
The FDA aims to ensure consumers are exposed to truthful, non-misleading 
ads which are easily understood.221 
 
 214. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(5)(ii). 
 215. 21 C.F.R. § 202.1(e)(5)(i)-(iii); Hill, supra note 46, at 365. 
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VII.  MERCK & CO. INC.’S VIOXX® 
A. Development and Production of Vioxx® 
Approved by the FDA in May 1999, Rofecoxib, developed by Merck & 
Co. Inc. and sold under the name Vioxx®, was an anti-inflammatory drug used 
to treat osteoarthritis, acute pain conditions, menstrual symptoms, and 
rheumatoid arthritis in adults and children.222  Vioxx was a prescription 
Cyclooxygenase-2 inhibitor, a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug 
(NSAID).223  NSAID pain relievers also include several over the counter 
medications such as Advil (Ibuprofen) and Aleve (Naproxen Sodium).224  
Vioxx “relieved pain by blocking the enzyme cyclooxygenase (COX), which is 
required for the production of prostaglandins—chemicals that mediate the pain 
response.”225  NSAIDs, besides inhibiting prostaglandins which are 
responsible for the pain sensation, also reduce swelling, inflammation and 
irritation which all worsen pain.226  NSAIDs have long been used for 
alleviation of “chronic or acute inflammation and pain associated with 
osteoarthritis, rheumatoid arthritis, and other musculoskeletal conditions”227  
However, traditional NSAID treatments were accompanied by a significant 
increased risk of gastrointestinal perforations, ulcers, and bleeding.228  
Researchers later determined the COX enzyme had two forms.229  COX-1 was 
found to affect production of prostaglandins which aid in protecting the 
stomach lining whereas COX-2 was found to affect production of 
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prostaglandins which are responsible for both pain and inflammation.230  
Discovering the two forms of the COX enzyme “led scientists to hypothesize 
that ‘selective’ NSAIDs designed to inhibit COX-2, but not COX-1 could offer 
the same pain relief as traditional NSAIDs with the reduced risk of fatal or 
debilitating gastrointestinal perforations, ulcers, and bleeding.”231  The 
“selective” NSAIDs became known as “COX-2 Inhibitors,” of which Vioxx 
was one.232  At the same time Merck was developing Vioxx, Pfizer Co. was 
also developing its COX-2 inhibitor Celebrex, which beat Vioxx to the market 
by six months. 
Vioxx was an improvement over traditional NSAIDs because it did not 
carry the same risk of gastrointestinal bleeding as COX-1 inhibitors; 
“[b]ecause the newest drugs block COX-2, and have minimal effects on COX-
1, they are considered significant pharmacologic advances.”233  In particular, 
six clinical trials showed Vioxx relieved joint pain and stiffness in patients 
with osteoarthritis.234 
In order to receive FDA approval, Merck conducted the Vioxx 
Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research (VIGOR) study, through which the 
company intended to show that Vioxx caused fewer gastrointestinal problems 
than predecessor drug Naproxen.235  Merck submitted the VIGOR study results 
to the FDA in June, 2000.  However, along with a reduction in gastrointestinal 
problems, the research also showed patients taking Vioxx had a rate of heart 
attacks five times greater than those taking the older Naproxen.236  Merck 
justified the results by stating that Naproxen had cardioprotective effects which 
aided in preventing heart attacks.  Merck quickly followed the VIGOR study 
with their Adenomatous Polyp Prevention on Vioxx (APPROVe) study.237  
Merck’s APPROVe study confirmed the VIGOR findings that Vioxx carried 
with it an increased risk of heart attack and stroke.238 
 
 230. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 401 F. Supp. 2d 565, 571 (E.D. La. 2005). 
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The studies showed that inhibiting COX-2 without the inhibition of COX-1 
caused blood clotting, which led to the side effects creating the basis for the 
Vioxx litigation.239 
What explains the clotting effect. . . .is that inhibiting COX-2 allowed a pro-
thrombotic factor, thromboxane (a vaso constrictor which induces blood 
clotting), to increase whereas allowing COX-1 to remain unrestrained stopped 
the prostacyclin whose job is to inhibit platelet aggregation (blood clotting).  
Thus the balance in users was switched toward clotting.240 
Clotting increases risk of heart attack and stroke because clots block arteries 
and lead to ischemia (a restriction in blood supply) after the blockage.241  
Strokes result from blockages of cerebral arteries or carotid arteries feeding 
blood to the brain.242  Further troubling for Vioxx is the risk of blockage is 
much higher in those with narrowed arteries, (i.e. the elderly and those with 
existing heart problems), which makes it easier for clots to lodge and block 
those arteries.243 
In February 2001, the FDA advisory panel recommended the FDA require 
a change in Vioxx’s packaging insert to relate the results of the VIGOR study 
of increased rates of heart attack and stroke.244  However, Merck continued 
aggressively marketing Vioxx to physicians and downplayed Vioxx’s role in 
increasing stroke and heart attacks.  In September 2001, the FDA sent Merck a 
warning letter stating  “You have engaged in a promotional campaign for 
Vioxx that minimizes the potentially serious cardiovascular findings that were 
observed in the Vioxx Gastrointestinal Outcomes Research (VIGOR) 
study.”245  In April 2002, the FDA required Merck to include the warning 
regarding increased stroke and heart attack in its packaging.246 
On September 30, 2004, following publication of their APPROVe study, 
Merck announced an immediate voluntarily withdrawal of Vioxx from the 
market.247  Raymond Gilmartin, president and CEO of Merck at the time of the 
withdrawal, stated: 
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We are taking this action because we believe it best serves the interests of 
patients. . . .Although we believe it would have been possible to continue to 
market VIOXX with labeling that would incorporate these new data, given the 
availability of alternative therapies, and the questions raised by the data, we 
concluded that a voluntary withdrawal is the responsible course to take.248 
As previously discussed, Vioxx was the most heavily advertised drug in 
2000, with Merck spending $160 million on marketing the new drug which 
netted a 360% increase in sales.249  Between May 1999 and the withdrawal of 
September 2004, 105 million Vioxx prescriptions were filled in the United 
States alone to an estimated 20 million patients.250  In 2003, Vioxx worldwide 
sales topped $2.5 billion.251 
B. Current Vioxx® Litigation 
Following Merck’s voluntary withdrawal of Vioxx on September 30, 2004, 
thousands of individual lawsuits and roughly 160 class actions were filed in 
state and federal courts alleging tort and products liability claims.252  “The 
latest mass tort, and perhaps one that will rival the fen-phen diet drug 
litigation, involves Vioxx. . . Suits are being brought in many forums for heart 
attacks, sudden cardiac death and strokes, as well as for a number of other side 
effects.”253  Due to the volume of suits, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation designated the Vioxx Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) and ordered it 
consolidated into one court.254  Thereafter, all Vioxx suits filed in federal 
courts were transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Louisiana, for coordination of discovery and pretrial matters.255 
Merck currently faces 27,000 individual Vioxx lawsuits nationwide.256  As 
of December 31, 2006, 4,025 Vioxx related claims had been dismissed before 
being scheduled for trial, more than 1,225 of which were dismissed with 
prejudice.257  Thirty-one Vioxx suits, as of March 27, 2006, had been 
scheduled for trial.258  Fourteen of the thirty-one were either dismissed or 
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withdrawn from the trial calendars by the plaintiffs, ten resulted in jury 
verdicts in Merck’s favor,259 five verdicts in the plaintiff’s favor and two ended 
with hung juries and remain unresolved mistrials.260 
Claims against Merck allege a myriad of causes of action.  Most prevalent 
is the failure of the duty to warn, which is therefore accompanied with the 
issues surrounding the LID and DTC advertising.261  Claimants are attempting 
to circumvent the LID by claiming that Merck failed to provide adequate 
warning to their prescribing physicians.262  Whether or not adequate warnings 
were provided to physicians is a question of fact, and the plaintiffs are 
therefore trying to reach the jury.263  However, one commentator noted, “[w]e 
think that the learned intermediary doctrine, the FDA approval process . . . and 
the statistical realities of the Vioxx record will combine to provide Merck with 
a potent defense.”264 
The combined jury instruction in Cona v. Merck & Co., Inc, and McDarby 
v. Merck & Co., Inc., provided that Merck, as manufacturer of Vioxx, had a 
duty to make a product that is reasonably safe, which required dissemination of 
adequate warnings of the product’s risks.265  If a manufacturer fails to provide 
an adequate warning, the product is thus deemed defective under the law.266  
Therefore, Merck had a duty to provide adequate warnings about the dangers 
of its product.  “In the case of a prescription drug adequate warning must be 
given to the doctors who will prescribe the drug.  This is true because it is the 
prescribing doctor who has to decide whether to prescribe a prescription drug 
to a patient.”267  The judge’s statement shows the jury was instructed to take 
into consideration the LID. 
 
 259. The latest of the verdicts in favor of Merck and Co., Inc. was recently reached on March 
27, 2007 in Madison County, Illinois, a jurisdiction renowned around the country for a history of 
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to adequately warn Schwaller’s prescribing physicians of risks associated with Vioxx use.  Id. 
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In McDarby, the plaintiff’s claim alleged that an increased risk of heart 
attack was known or knowable to Merck who failed to adequately warn 
physicians that patients with heart attack risk factors should not be prescribed 
the drug.268  Merck contended, however, that it provided adequate warning of 
any risks that were known or knowable when the plaintiff used Vioxx.269  “If 
the defendant proves that there was no risk or the other risk was not known or 
knowable during those times, then it had no duty to warn of any such risk and 
cannot be held liable for failure to do so.”270 
McDarby, for which the above jury instruction was written, resulted in a 
$13.5 million plaintiff’s award after the jury found that Vioxx was a substantial 
contributing factor to his heart attack.271  Plaintiff’s complaint alleged Merck 
failed to disclose potential dangers associated with the Vioxx use and also 
claimed misrepresentation to physicians and the public of any of the drug’s 
dangers through advertisements.272  The plaintiff, who provided records 
indicating four years of Vioxx use, claimed long term use of the drug was both 
the cause in fact and proximate case of his heart attack.273  Merck, however, 
contended it met all FDA regulations concerning Vioxx by providing the FDA 
with all mandated information and therefore fulfilled its duty to warn.274  The 
jury disagreed with Merck and reached a unanimous verdict finding that the 
manufacturer failed to adequately warn the patient of an increased risk of heart 
attack associated with the drug and that their failure to warn proximately 
caused his injuries.275 
Similarly, the jury in Barnett v. Merck & Co., Inc. awarded $51 million in 
damages to the plaintiff, Barnett, who they found suffered a heart attack 
attributed to Vioxx use.276  Barnett began taking Vioxx in 1999 for chronic 
neck pain and subsequently suffered a heart attack three years later, but 
continued taking the drug until its 2004 withdrawal.277  Barnett claimed Merck 
was liable for failing to warn him of product dangers and was negligent in its 
representation and production of Vioxx.278  Merck, relying on the LID, argued 
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it discharged its duty by providing warnings to prescribing physicians and was 
therefore not liable.279  The jury found Merck did not fail to warn the plaintiff 
of the danger, but was negligent for failing to warn Barnett’s prescribing 
physicians of the risks associated with Vioxx.280  Judge Fallon, presiding over 
Vioxx MDL litigation, found the award was “grossly excessive” and ordered a 
new trial for damages alone.281 
Ernst v. Merck and Co., Inc., provided the largest award to date for a 
Vioxx claim, awarding the family of a deceased Vioxx patient $253.4 million 
in damages.282  Ernst was prescribed Vioxx in 2000 to relieve tendonitis pain 
and died of a heart attack six months later.283  Ernst’s family alleged Merck 
knew of the danger and continued to market Vioxx knowing it was unsafe and 
that Merck misrepresented Vioxx’s safety to the public via marketing 
campaigns.284  Merck countered by arguing Vioxx was not inherently 
dangerous, that warnings provided both to patients and physicians were legal 
as approved by the FDA, that it did not knowingly mislead consumers, and that 
the patient’s death resulted from pre-existing medical conditions.285  Contrary 
to the manufacturer’s contentions, the jury found both marketing and design 
defects to be producing causes of Ernst’s death and Merck’s negligence as the 
proximate cause.286  Although the jury awarded the plaintiffs $253 million, 
Texas punitive damages caps will reduce the award to roughly $26 million. 
In contrast, Dedrick v. Merck and Co., Inc. resulted in a quite different 
outcome.287  The plaintiff in Dedrick alleged he suffered a heart attack after 
taking Vioxx for six months.288  The plaintiff claimed Merck failed to 
adequately warn consumers and physicians of Vioxx’s associated risks and 
also breached various implied warranties by misrepresenting material facts to 
his prescribing physician.289  Specifically, the plaintiff stated, “If not for those 
 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at *4. 
 281. In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 448 F. Supp. 2d 737, 741 (E.D. La. 2006).  In explaining 
his reasoning, Judge Fallon states “The Court finds that the $50 Million compensatory damages 
award is excessive under any conceivable substantive standard of excessiveness.  The evidence 
suggests that the Plaintiff may have lost nine or ten years of life expectancy as a result of his use 
of Vioxx. . . .Therefore, no reasonable jury could have found that Plaintiff’s total losses totaled 
$50 Million.” Id. at 740. 
 282. Jury Verdict, Ernst v. Merck & Co., Inc., 2005 WL 2760303, at *2 (23d Jud. D. Tex. 
2005) (Brazoria County Jury Awards Family of Deceased Vioxx User $253.4 Million). 
 283. Id. at *3. 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. at *4. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Jury Verdict, Dedrick v. Merck & Co., Inc., 2006 WL 40077593, at *2 (E.D. La. 2006) 
(Merck Prevails After Jury Rejects Tennessee Man’s Vioxx Claim). 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at *2-*3. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2007] “ASK YOUR DOCTOR IF THIS PRODUCT IS RIGHT FOR YOU” 457 
negligent misrepresentations, his physicians would not have prescribed the 
drug.”290  Merck argued no evidence of increased risk of heart attack existed at 
the plaintiff’s dosage level and that his pre-existing cardiovascular disease was 
the actual cause his injuries.291  In December 2006, a jury found “Merck 
properly warned Dedrick’s treating physician about known risks at the time, 
and that Merck’s alleged failure adequately warn his physician was not the 
proximate cause of Dedrick’s injuries.”292 
The LID plays a specific roll in regards to Vioxx cases during the pre-trial 
stages.  Specifically, in In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, Merck, 
arguing on the grounds of the LID, successfully defended a certification 
motion for a national class of personal injury and wrongful death claims.293  In 
denying certification, the court focused on the lack of typicality among 
claimants.294  The court stated: 
In this case, both the proposed class representatives and the putative 
class members assert various products liability claims against Merck 
under theories of negligence, strict liability, failure to warn, and 
defective design. While these claims involve common issues, they also 
involve individual issues such as injury, causation, the learned 
intermediary doctrine and comparative fault.295 
Further, in Kennedy v. Merck & Co., Inc., an Ohio appellate court affirmed 
a grant of summary judgment for Merck on the basis of the LID.296  Kennedy, 
on behalf of his deceased wife, claimed Merck failed to adequately warn her 
that anaphylactoid reactions could occur by taking Vioxx.297  Kennedy’s wife 
was given free samples of Vioxx from her physician which contained a 
statement on the package to see accompanying packaging insert for product 
warnings.  However, Kennedy’s wife was not given the packaging insert from 
her physician.  The court noted that Kennedy did not argue the warnings 
provided to the prescribing physician were inadequate, but that the warnings 
were inadequate due to the manner in which they were conveyed to his wife.298  
The trial court found Merck had no duty to ensure advertisements and printed 
materials containing warnings provided directly to physicians reached the 
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actual patient.299  Specifically, the appellate court, quoting the trial court, 
stated “‘[c]onstruing these facts and R.C. 2307.76(c) in a light most favorable 
to Mr. Kennedy, reasonable minds could only conclude that Merck discharged 
its duty to warn Mrs. Kennedy of the possibility of adverse reactions to Vioxx 
by warning Dr. Striebel of the risks.’”300  The appellate court, affirming the 
trial court’s grant of summary judgment, held that “Under the [LID], there 
exists no requirement that Merck give any warnings for Vioxx to the consumer 
if the warnings provided to the physician are adequate.”301 
Thus, litigation regarding the LID and the duty to warn centers on a fact-
determination of whether Merck provided an adequate warning to prescribing 
physicians.  Specific attention, however, is being given to what Merck knew of 
potential adverse effects and when it knew of them.  If juries find an 
inadequate warning was provided to physicians, the LID will be inapplicable 
and Merck will be subject to products liability claims for failure of the duty to 
warn. 
VIII.  ANALYSIS 
The learned intermediary doctrine should continue to play a strong role 
even in the face of increased DTC advertising.  Pharmaceutical companies 
should not face increased liability as a result of direct product advertising or be 
held liable for failing to provide all potential adverse effects in a thirty second 
television spot.  The fact remains that physicians are more directly targeted by 
drug manufacturer marketing than consumers302 and are the ones ultimately 
responsible for writing the prescription.303  Thus, there should be no change in 
the current allocations of the duty to warn as it should continue to fall on 
physicians to ensure the drugs being prescribed are in the patient’s best interest 
and that he is aware of any adverse effects accompanying treatment. 
The bottom line is that pharmaceuticals themselves are not changing, and 
neither are the dangers with which they are accompanied.  Patients still must 
have symptoms treated by the medication, and physicians still must make the 
decision to prescribe.  What has changed, however, is the patient’s awareness 
of treatment options and his subjective opinion of his ailments.  By requiring 
certain drugs be available only by prescription, the FDA reflects a policy 
statement that individual consumers cannot truly comprehend a drug’s effects 
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and therefore, safe usage demands professional intervention.304  When 
prescribing, the duty rests on the physician to examine the patient and 
determine if a requested or needed treatment is appropriate in the 
circumstance.  Therefore, the duty should remain on the physician to ensure 
the drugs prescribed are best suited for a patient who is fully aware of the 
associated risks.  If the LID is an attempt to “preserve the primacy of the 
physician’s role in making treatment decisions for patients, including the 
making of informed choices about prescription drugs,”305 courts should 
unequivocally continue to apply the doctrine.  This holds especially true in an 
age of increased DTC advertising and usurpation by patients and MCOs of the 
physician’s role in treatment decisions. 
Those arguing that DTC advertising has changed the role of patient and 
physician are misguided.306  The patient-physician relationship has not been 
fundamentally changed by DTC advertising as critics purport.  Instead, 
managed care organizations and a patient per hour rate increase should be 
considered when discussing physicians writing prescriptions for requested 
drugs.  The LID is premised on the principle that prescribing physicians are in 
the best position to evaluate the patient’s needs, to understand the significance 
of the risks involved and to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
a prescription based therapy.307  The fact that physicians are in the best 
position to evaluate the patient’s needs remains unchanged regardless of the 
advertising dollars spent by drug manufacturers.  For the basis of the LID, the 
fundamental relationship of ill patients needing prescriptions and physicians 
being required to write them, is unchanged. 
With regard to impending Vioxx litigation, again, courts should not 
recognize a DTC exception to the LID.  The duty should remain with the 
physician to warn potential patients of product hazards so long as reasonable 
warnings were supplied and made available by the manufacturer.  Thus, jurors 
should only consider whether an adequate warning was provided to the 
physician, not the end consumer, when contemplating verdicts. Specifically, 
Merck complied with FDA regulations following the VIGOR study by 
including packaging inserts that were received by both patients and physicians.  
 
 304. Id. at 13-14. 
 305. Robinson, Jr. & Calcagnie, supra note 78, at 2. 
 306. See generally Perez v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999) (holding drug 
manufacturers employing DTC are not protected by LID exception to the general duty to warn); 
Renee Matter, Emerging DTC Advertising of Prescription Drugs and the Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine: Even in the Absence of a True Patient-Physician Relationship, Drug Manufacturers 
can Protect Themselves by Warning Consumers Directly, 69 DEF. COUNS. J. 79, 87 (2005) 
(stating DTC advertising changed the roles and relationships of patients and physicians and 
undercut the premises of the LID as DTC removes the physician from the learned intermediary 
role and encourages patients to request certain pharmaceuticals). 
 307. Robinson, Jr. & Calcagnie, supra note 78, at 1. 
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Merck’s liability should not simply rest on the fact that Vioxx was marketed 
directly to the consumers, but instead on whether meeting FDA mandates 
suffice to meet the manufacturer’s duty to adequately warn prescribing 
physicians. 
Considering increases in medical malpractice suits against doctors, and 
that the duty to warn should remain with those physicians, perhaps it is time 
for part of the burden of the duty to warn to fall on another group.308  
Regardless of the duty imposed by state and federal regulations regarding 
product warning requirements, and likely to be an unpopular suggestion, 
perhaps the consumers should have the ultimate duty of inquiring into 
substances they ingest.  Consumers are undoubtedly aware some risks and 
potential side effects are inherent in taking prescription drugs.  The best tool 
for educating the public as to possible adverse effects of pharmaceuticals may 
be to place a share of the burden directly on the consumer himself to inquire 
into those effects.  The question of “how might this drug affect me?” should be 
the first statement out of a patient’s mouth after requesting any pharmaceutical 
treatment. 
The doctrine of caveat emptor was once the predominate rule in 
purchasing products and property.  Perhaps a revival of the doctrine, even to a 
slight degree, would be the best policy for ensuring consumers are aware of 
potential adverse effects of pharmaceuticals.  To borrow a moderately 
applicable quote, “[m]y point is that you have to think for yourself. If your 
parents told you that chocolate was dangerous would you take their word for 
it?  Exactly! So perhaps instead of acting like sheep when it comes to 
[pharmaceuticals] you should find out for yourself.”309 
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 308. Please note that it is far from this author’s opinion that health care providers should face 
any increase in liability.  In fact, it is unfortunate doctors are facing the current litigious climate 
which surrounds their profession.  Also please note that patients should not have to rummage 
through obscure documents to be apprised of dangers associated with a prescription drug.  
Instead, the suggestion is that the patients should take some responsibility in being aware of the 
drug’s possible adverse affects and contraindications. 
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